# 1NC

I negate. We take actions for a purpose, and have those purposes because of higher purposes, but the justification for action must end somewhere, with self-evidence purposes. These are basic goods. Grisez:

Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends”, American Journal of Jurisdiction vol. 32, 1987. RK

Even when one's purpose is not distinct from one's action, something about the action underlies one's rational interest in doing it. One's reasons for playing a particular game or reading a particular novel are goods which are only instantiated through actions chosen for these reasons. Thus, playing and knowing always have their basic appeal, insofar as they are goods, but like other goods they can be realized only in limited ways through particular actions. Some goods are reasons for acting which need a further reason to explain the interest people take in them. We call such reasons for acting. For example, as a reason for acting, winning a prize needs a further reason which motivates one to win. The further reason will be the reason why one is interested in some further purpose, such as using the prize, showing that one has the necessary capabilities, and so on. One does finish deliberating and begin acting, and there cannot be an infinite regress in the goods which are reasons for acting. Plainly, then, there are reasons for acting which need no further reason; these are goods, one or more of which underlie any purpose. We call these BASIC GOODS. Actions specifically human in their motivation are done for the sake of one or more of these goods; every such action is chosen in view of one or more BASIC PURPOSES**.** Basic purposes are those whose achievement will immediately instantiate basic goods.

This principle is self-evident: all rational acts are acts for reasons – that is, acts that are not pointless. This requirement generates a stronger principle of morality, which requires that we never choose against a basic good. Grisez 2:

Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,” 32 Am. J. Juris. 99 1987.

Even morally bad actions have their point. One chooses to do what is morally wrong for some reason, and like any other deliberate action, the reason for which one acts immorally must ultimately be reduced to the basic goods. So far forth, even an immoral act responds to the first principle: Good is to be done and pursued. *However*, morally wrong acts do not respond to this principle as perfectly as morally good acts do. To see why, one must consider the relationship between the principles of practical knowledge and those of morality. In prohibiting pointlessness, the first principle of practical reasoning as it were demands: Take as a premise at least one of the principles corresponding to the basic goods and follow through to the point at which you somehow instantiate that good through action. This demand is minimal and leaves one free to do anything from which one can anticipate any benefit whatsoever. One can imagine another principle making [makes] a far stronger demand: Insofar as it is in your power, allow nothing but the principles corresponding to the basic goods to shape your practical thinking as you find, develop, and use your opportunities to pursue human fulfillment through your chosen actions. This stronger demand is, not only that one be reasonable enough in one's practical thinking to avoid pointless- ness, but that one be entirely reasonable in such thinking. This stronger demand is inconsistent with many possible choices consistent with the weaker demand**.** The possible choices excluded by the stronger demand are those which are immoral, for the stronger demand is a way of expressing the first principle of morality. This expression of the first moral principle makes it clear that to be morally good is precisely to be completely reasonable. Right reason is nothing but unfettered reason, working throughout deliberation and receiving full attention**.**

We act rationally because of basic goods. Morality requires us to act rationally. Therefore being moral is to be completely rational, i.e. by respecting all basic goods. Thus, the standard is the first principle of morality, which requires that one only choose options whose willing is compatible with a will towards the full set of basic goods. There can be tradeoffs among different goods, and agents can permissibly choose in such tradeoffs, but not by choosing directly against one of the basic goods.

I contend that a victim’s use of deliberate deadly force is a violation of the will towards basic human goods. First, deliberate killing requires the killer to take an attitude towards life that does not respect human fulfillment. Grisez 3:

Grisez, Germain. [Former Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland], “Toward A Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing.” AmJJruis 15 [1970].

In this nonutilitarian moral outlook, whether or not another person's death is admitted within the scope of our intention is extremely important. A difference of intention can relate identical behavior in quite different ways to our moral attitude, and to the self being created through our moral attitude. If one intends to kill another, he accepts the identity of killer as an aspect of his moral self. If he is to be a killer through his own self-determination, he must regard himself in any situation as the lord of life and of death. The good of life must be rated as a measurable value, not as an immeasurable dignity. Others' natural attitudes toward their own lives must be regarded as an irrational fact, not as a starting point for reasonable community. However, if one intends not the death of another but only the safety of his own life, then one need not identify himself as a killer. One's attitude toward human life itself and toward everything related to it can remain that of a person unwilling to take human life.

But, human life is a basic good. Grisez 4:

Germain Grisez, [Former Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland], *The Way of the Lord Jesus* Vol. 1, RK

Rational reflection supports the truth faith teaches. First, the instrumental view of the good of human life implies dualism. As already explained, intrinsic human goods are not possessions of persons, but the fulfillment of their being. On the instrumental view of life, life is not part of the intrinsic good of persons. However, life certainly is not separable from the living body, as if it were a mere possession. Thus, on the instrumental view of the good of life, the living body will be one thing and the fulfilled person something else. Thus the instrumental view of the good of human life implies dualism. Second, dualism is indefensible (see *S.t.,* 1, q. 75, a. 4; q. 76, a. 1). Life is not merely one process among others, a process which can be distinguished from breathing, feeling, choosing, talking, and so on. The life of a person is indistinguishable from the person’s very reality. Life must pervade every part and activity of a person, or something of the person would be unreal. Moreover, one’s fulfillment is the completion of one’s given self. If the personal goods which constitute fulfillment were other than one’s given self, one could not fulfill oneself by acting.

Finally, according to New Oxford American Dictionary, deliberate acts are “done consciously and intentionally,” so the aff’s version of self-defense is impermissible because the killer intends the attacker’s death and not just self-preservation. Justice Robert Hunter furthers:

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"[First-degree murder](http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/F/FirstDegreeMurder.aspx) is the unlawful killing of another human being with malice and with premeditation and *deliberation*. "A killing is *premeditated* if the defendant formed the specific intent to kill the victim some period of time, however short, before the actual killing. "A killing is deliberate if the defendant acted in a cool state of blood, in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge or to accomplish an unlawful purpose and not under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by lawful or just cause or legal provocation. "Premeditation and *deliberation* are usually proven by circumstantial evidence because they are mental processes that are not readily susceptible to proof by direct evidence."

However, even if he proves that it is necessary to kill in self-defense, that is not sufficient to meet my standard. The killer’s ultimate end should still be only self-defense and not the death of the attacker. McMahan:

Jeff McMahan, [Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers], “Revising the Doctrine of Double Effect”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol.11, No. 2, 1994. RK

One problem with these responses is that they appear to exclude some applications of the DDE that its proponents have wished to defend. For example, in a passage that many have cited as the origin of the DDE, Thomas Aquinas argues that**,** while it is wrong for one person to intend to kill another even in self-defence, killing in self-defence may still be permissible provided that the lethal act of defence is carried out with the intention only to preserve one’s own life. Aquinas thus assumes that it is possible for one to foresee with certainty that one’s act will kill one’s assailant without intending the killing as a means of self-defence **[4].** Various recent defenders of the DDE have accepted a view quite similar to Aquinas’s. To illustrate their view, consider**:** Self-Defence I **:** One’s only defence against an unjust and potentially lethal attack is to shoot the attacker at close range with a flame-thrower. The followers of Aquinas would accept that, in Self-Defence 1, it is possible to fire the flame-thrower intending only to incapacitate and not to kill the attacker, while foreseeing that one’s action would in fact kill him in the process of incapacitating him. The killing, or the death of the attacker, could, according to these theorists, be an unintended (though of course not *accidental)* side-effect [5].This, I believe, is quite plausible.

The death of the attacker can only be either an accident or a foreseen consequence, but never the initial purpose of the deadly force.

# Case- Lay

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The death of the attacker can only be either an accident or a foreseen consequence, but never the initial purpose of the deadly force. Therefore, because killing in revenge is never permissible, I negate.

# CP

Text: It is morally permissible for victims of repeated domestic abuse to use deadly force against their attackers with self-preservation as their ONLY end. McMahan explains:

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Competition: The aff has to defend victims using deadly force against their attackers with the ultimate goal of the DEATH OF THE ATTACKER, not just SELF-PRESERVATION.

1. According to New Oxford American Dictionary, deliberate acts are “done consciously and intentionally,” so the aff’s version of self-defense is impermissible because the killer intends the attacker’s death and not just self-preservation.
2. Deliberate killings legally defined as instances where the attacker’s death was intended as an end-in-itself. Justice Robert Hunter writes:

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Net Benefit: The victim’s use of deliberate deadly force is a violation of the will towards basic human goods, so it is impermissible.

We take actions for a purpose, and have those purposes because of higher purposes, but the justification for action must end somewhere, with self-evidence purposes. These are basic goods, i.e. what we are naturally disposed to pursue. Grisez:

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Even when one's purpose is not distinct from one's action, something about the action underlies one's rational interest in doing it. One's reasons for playing a particular game or reading a particular novel are goods which are only instantiated through actions chosen for these reasons. Thus, playing and knowing always have their basic appeal, insofar as they are goods, but like other goods they can be realized only in limited ways through particular actions. Some goods are reasons for acting which need a further reason to explain the interest people take in them. We call such reasons for acting. For example, as a reason for acting, winning a prize needs a further reason which motivates one to win. The further reason will be the reason why one is interested in some further purpose, such as using the prize, showing that one has the necessary capabilities, and so on. One does finish deliberating and begin acting, and there cannot be an infinite regress in the goods which are reasons for acting. Plainly, then, there are reasons for acting which need no further reason; these are goods, one or more of which underlie any purpose. We call these BASIC GOODS. Actions specifically human in their motivation are done for the sake of one or more of these goods; every such action is chosen in view of one or more BASIC PURPOSES**.** Basic purposes are those whose achievement will immediately instantiate basic goods.

And, human life is a basic good because it is a prerequisite of the indefinite goals and purposes that could be set. Finnis 2:

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An account of basic reasons for action should not be exclusively rationalistic. It should not portray human flourishing in terms only of the exercise of our capacities to reason. We are organic substances, animals, and part of our genuine well-being is our bodily life, maintained in health, vigour and safety, and transmitted to new human beings. To regard human life as a basic reason for action is to understand it as a good in which indefinitely many beings can participate in indefinitely many occasions and ways, going far beyond any goal or purpose which anyone could envisage and pursue, but making sense of indefinitely many goals. 3 And this sense of "reason for action" is common to all the other basic goods: knowledge of reality (including aesthetic appreciations of it); excellence in work and play whereby one transforms natural realities to express meanings and serve purposes; harmony between and amongst individuals and groups of persons (peace, neighbourliness and friendship); harmony between one's own feelings and one's judgments and choices (inner peace); harmony between one's choices and one's judgments and behaviour (peace of conscience and authenticity in the sense of consistency between one's self and its expression); and harmony between oneself and the wider reaches of reality including the reality that the world has some more- than-human source of meaning and value. To state the basic human goods is of course to propose an account of human nature.4 But it is not an attempt to deduce reasons for action from some pre-existing theoretical account of human nature in defiance of the logical truth (well known to the ancients) that you cannot deduce an "ought" from an "is"- since you cannot find in the conclusion to a syllogism what is not in the premises. Rather, a full account of human nature can only be given by one who understands the human goods practically, i.e., *as* reasons for choice and action, making full sense of feelings, spontaneities and behaviour. (So Aristotle's principal treatise on human na- ture is his *Ethics* which is from beginning to end an attempt to identify the human good, and is, according to Aristotle himself, from beginning to end an effort of *practical* understanding; the *Ethics* is not derivative from some prior treatise on human nature.) So one begins to see the sense of the term "natural law": reasons for actions which will instantiate and express human nature precisely because they participate in and realize human goods.

Finally, deliberate killing requires the killer to take an attitude towards life that does not respect human fulfillment. Grisez 3:

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# Deliberate Frontlines

Deliberate means the victim intended the killer’s death. Justice Ulrich:

Justice Robert Ulrich, [Missouri Court of Appeals], *State v Miller*

"A person commits the crime of [**murder in the first degree**](http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/F/FirstDegreeMurder.aspx) if he knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter. Deliberation required for conviction for [**murder in the first degree**](http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/F/FirstDegreeMurder.aspx) is defined as cool reflection for any length of time no matter how brief. The deliberation necessary to support a conviction of [**first-degree murder**](http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/F/FirstDegreeMurder.aspx) need only be momentary; it is only necessary that the evidence show that the defendant considered taking another's life in a deliberate state of mind. A deliberate act is a free act of the will done in furtherance of a formed design to gratify a feeling of revenge or to accomplish some other unlawful purpose and while not under the influence of violent passion suddenly aroused by some provocation. Deliberation may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the murder."

# Goods Are Incommensurable

The basic goods are incommensurable. Finnis:

John Finnis, [Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy at Oxford University], “Natural Law and Legal Reasoning”, Vol. 38 Cleveland State Law Review, 1990. RK

The problem of incommensurability-the problem that there is no *rationally* calibrated scale for "weighing" the goods and bads at stake in moral and political choice-is in reality much more intense than in the simple Dworkinian picture of legal reasoning along the two dimensions of legal fit and moral soundness. Everyone confronts that incommensur- ability when having to choose between coming to a lecture, reading a good book, going to the cinema, and talking to friends. At the other extreme, so to speak, is the incommensurability of the relevant goods and bads in relation to such a fundamental social choice as to have or to reject or renounce a nuclear deterrent. An exploration of such a choice amply illustrates and explains the impotence of all forms of aggregative reasoning towards morally significant choice-choice outside the purely technical or technological task of identifying the most efficient means to a single limited goal.' 9 For morally significant choice would be impossible if one of the options could be shown to be the best on a single scale which, as all aggregative reasoning does, ranked all options in a single transitive order.20 If there were a reason (for doing X) which some rational method of comparison (e.g., aggregation of goods) identified as preferable, the alternative reason (against doing X) thus identified as rationally inferior would cease to be rationally appealing in respect to that situation of choice. The reason thus identified as preferable, and the option favored by that reason, would be rationally unopposed. There would remain *no choice,* in the morally significant sense of choice, between the alternative options. 21 For one has a morally significant choice just where one really does have reasons for alternative options; for then the choice can be *free,* no factor but the choosing itself *settling* which alternative is chosen. So the reason why there are morally significant choices is precisely that there is no rational method of identifying the reasons for alternative options, *prior to moral* judgment, as rationally simply superior and inferior. That is to say, the instantiations of basic human goods, instantiations considered precisely as reasons for moral judgment and for action, are incommensurable with one another. And this is not surprising, for these instantiations are nothing other than aspects of human persons, present and future, and human persons cannot be weighed and balanced.22

We can’t pick between basic goods but we call an action prohibited if it involves choosing against a basic good.

John Finnis, [Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy at Oxford University], “Natural Law and Legal Reasoning”, Vol. 38 Cleveland State Law Review, 1990. RK

But one can identify reasons against an option, wherever (for example) that option involves choosing (intending) to destroy, damage or impede a basic human good, or imposing on persons, even as a side-effect, harms or burdens which one would not impose on oneself or one's friends and which one imposes for no motive other than differential feelings. Such reasons against a certain option must be respected unless some reason for that action is rationally preferable. 23 But what the argument about incommensurability shows is that no reason can be identified as rationally preferable to the reason not to choose to destroy or damage a basic good in a human person, or to the reason not to act unfairly.

# Life is a Basic Good

Life is key to integral human fulfillment because it pervades all of our actions. Grisez:

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Rational reflection supports the truth faith teaches. First, the instrumental view of the good of human life implies dualism. As already explained, intrinsic human goods are not possessions of persons, but the fulfillment of their being. On the instrumental view of life, life is not part of the intrinsic good of persons. However, life certainly is not separable from the living body, as if it were a mere possession. Thus, on the instrumental view of the good of life, the living body will be one thing and the fulfilled person something else. Thus the instrumental view of the good of human life implies dualism. Second, dualism is indefensible (see *S.t.,* 1, q. 75, a. 4; q. 76, a. 1). Life is not merely one process among others, a process which can be distinguished from breathing, feeling, choosing, talking, and so on. The life of a person is indistinguishable from the person’s very reality. Life must pervade every part and activity of a person, or something of the person would be unreal. Moreover, one’s fulfillment is the completion of one’s given self. If the personal goods which constitute fulfillment were other than one’s given self, one could not fulfill oneself by acting.

# A2 Intent Doesn’t Matter

1. Intent matters – determines the distinction between self-preservation and intending harm to a willer’s death.
2. His aff concedes that life is inherently valuable, which means self-defense must take into account the sanctity to life.
3. The framework proves that we can’t ever will against the directly integral fulfillment of human life. He’s conceding internal warrants in the FW that make his argument irrelevant.
4. Consequences are unpredictable . for any regularity in nature, doesn’t mean we should assume the future follows the past. The only thing that can be used to justify this is that “so far” the present has resembled the past. But that begs the ? b/c it assumes inductive reasoning.
5. Intention determines the type of acts things are. It determines moral rules and whether we should follow it. That puts him in a d.b. a) Intention isn’t relevant which means we have no reason to follow moral rules which means he can’t prove moral permissibilyt b/c that assume the existence of morality to say its permissibilyt, which means the resolution is false and you negate b/c skep is true or b) intention is relevant which means there’s a distinction between intending a harm against another and self preservation which means the NC solves 100% of the aff.
6. Only thing we have control over are our intentions everything else is out of our control.

# A2 WTF ARE THE BASIC GOODS

The basic human goods are simply aspects of human full-being. Grisez:

Germain Grisez, [Former Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland], *The Way of the Lord Jesus* Vol. 1, RK

One can distinguish human goods by noticing the assumptions implicit in one’s practical reasoning and that of other individuals and deliberative assemblies. In considering reasons in favor of proposals, deliberation quickly reaches some good which is taken to be not merely a means to an end but an aspect of personal fulfillment. Much effort is directed, for example, toward preserving life and health, and one needs no reason beyond themselves for concern about these goods. True, they can be considered means to other goods intrinsic to persons, but they can also be sought for themselves**.** 4. There are different senses in which a good can be said to be “sought for itself.” The human goods which fulfill persons should not be considered mere outcomes one wants and seeks—as the goals one will enjoy if action is successful. Such outcomes have the character of accomplishments rather than of self-fulfillment—that is, they remain extrinsic to the person. Basic human goods must instead be considered aspects of what one might call human “full-being.” They are sought for themselves in the sense that they are judged to be humanly fulfilling. They provide reasons for intelligently wanting something and choosing to act for it as a goal.

Figuring out the basic goods is not controversial or subjective. Grisez:

Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends”, American Journal of Jurisdiction vol. 32, 1987. RK

The most direct way to uncover the basic goods is by considering actions and asking, "Why are you doing that?" and "Why should we do that?" and so on. Persisting with such questions eventually un- covers a small number of basic purposes of diverse kinds. These purposes arouse interest because their intelligible aspects are instantiations of the diverse basic goods. The diversity of the basic goods is neither a mere contingent fact about human psychology nor an accident of history [section IV(B-C)]. Rather, being aspects of the fulfillment of persons, these goods correspond to the inherent complexities of human nature, as it is manifested both in individuals and in various forms of community. In other works we have provided somewhat different lists of the most general categories of basic goods. But the following seven categories now seem to us adequate.

The basic goods are self-evident. Grisez:

Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends”, American Journal of Jurisdiction vol. 32, 1987. RK

The question naturally arises: If the principles of practical knowledge serve as ultimate rational grounds for proposing actions to be done, how can these principles themselves come to be known? As first principles, they cannot be derived from any theoretical knowledge [sec- tions I(B); IV(A); VI(B); VIII(C)]. Thus, they cannot be verified by experience or deduced from any more basic truths through a middle term. They are self-evident. Self-evident principles are per se nota-known just by knowing the meaning of their terms. This does not mean that they are mere linguistic clarifications, nor that they are intuitions-insights unrelated to data [see section III(B)]. Rather, it means that these truths are known (nota) without any middle term (per se), by understanding what is signified by their terms.

# A2 Moral Forfeiture

1. This argument ignores the standard --- if I’m winning the framework then we can’t ever will against the death of another. Moral forfeiture would assume that we can.

2. There is no internal warrant why they lose moral status. Everyone has an equal claim to the basic goods, independent of the actions that you take. Grisez:

Grisez, Germain. [Former Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland], “Toward A Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing.” AmJJruis 15 [1970].

Of course, a person does in some sense degrade himself by his wrong- doing. Yet such self-degradation, even if it is conceived as a kind of existential suicide, cannot alter one's human nature or detract from one's inherent dignity as a human person. Our consensus today surely would be that if we treat even the worst criminals as if they were animals (or worse than animals) we brutalize ourselves and dishonor our own humanity. Each good that is intrinsic to the human person participates in the dignity of the person, a dignity that is beyond calculable price and measurable worth. Goods for man can be priced; goods in man can only be prized**.** An athletic accomplishment, an aesthetic experience, or a scientific discovery is a good intrinsic to a human person. Each has its dignity; none is a calculable or measurable value. The dignity of such goods is inalienable. No matter how wicked a man might be, his participation in such goods would remain inherently good. Similarly, life itself is a good intrinsic to the person. For this reason, human life, simply by the fact that it is human life, shares in the dignity of the person. We may be right in feeling that a wrongdoer is not worthy of life, but such a feeling attests to the fact that life itself is a good of the personal order. If we attack the life of the wrongdoer, we destroy that which remains good— his human life. Perhaps we do so in order to indirectly attack in him the moral evil we hate and fear. If so, it seems we are willing to do an evil by destroying a good in order that we may achieve the good of destroying an evil.

My argument is not that you can’t kill them- it is possible they will be killed in self-defense. My argument is that the *reason* they lose their life cannot be because their basic goods disappear, because that is impossible.

3. Moral forfeiture leads to absurd conclusions. Green:

Green, Professor Law, LSU, 1999 (Stuart P., University of Illinois Law Review)

Like the lesser evils theory, the moral forfeiture theory is not without its difficulties. Among other things, as Bedau has argued, it involves a corollary of lex talionis that few would be willing to accept: "If a student cheats on an examination, no one believes that he therewith deserves to be treated unfairly by his classmates or his instructor; if my neighbor deliberately hurts a pet of mine, no one believes that I am now entitled to hurt some pet of his." n91

# A2 Death is a Necessary Means

1. It might be the case that the death of the attacker is a necessary *means* to self-preservation, but that still doesn’t make it the ultimate goal of the victim’s action. My Hunter evidence indicates that “deliberate” means they seek the attacker’s death as an end in itself, which is impermissible.
2. Just because death is necessary doesn’t mean the killer has to regard death as a desirable end. Grisez:

Grisez, Germain. [Former Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland], “Toward A Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing.” AmJJruis 15 [1970].

Ethically, however, even if an attacker killed by defensive action is not killed unintentionally—*i.e.,* accidentally—one defending himself with a proportionate response that will in fact be deadly need not turn against life, need not regard death (even the attacker's) as if it were any sort of good. In this sense one who kills in self-defense need not intend (tend toward) the attacker's death. By contrast, one who seeks anyone's death either as an objective or as a means—the hired gunman—does regard death as a good, for death as such will be at least useful if not itself a source of satisfaction**.**

But, my contention evidence shows that the victim *does* regard death as a desirable end, which is impermissible.

2. Death of the attacker does not contributes directly to the objective of self-defense but is merely a contingent fact. Grisez:

Grisez, Germain. [Former Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland], “Toward A Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing.” AmJJruis 15 [1970].

Still, it may be argued that the scope of intention cannot in reality exclude killing if one purposely performs a deadly deed, knowing it to be so, even though one's objective is his own safety rather than the other's harm. If one intends a certain objective, does he not also intend the means that are necessary for it? I think the proper answer is "yes" if one refers to the means in a strict sense—that is, to that which is conducive to one's objective in a positive way, considered precisely insofar as it is conducive. A hired assassin whose objective is the pay he will earn only if the victim dies intends to kill the victim, even though that death considered by itself would be indifferent, or even repugnant, to him. However, a rule to the effect that he who intends the end intends the means does not imply that one who kills in self-defense intends the assailant's death. For the other's death does not as such contribute anything directly to the objective of self-defense. The means considered strictly—a degree of counterforce sufficient to halt the attack or render it harmless—may happen to be deadly to the attacker. But if so, that is only a contingent fact. The death of the attacker is not the means of self-defense; rather, the means of self-defense happens to involve the attacker's death. The distinction is not vacuous, as is illustrated by a case in which the attacker happens to be put out of commission without his expected death occurring. If the intention is self-defense, the attacker's life is spared; if the intention is the death of the attacker, he is finished off.

# A2 Foreseen/Intended

There is definitely a distinction b/w foreseen and intended consequences. Grisez:

Grisez, Germain. [Former Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland], “Toward A Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing.” AmJJruis 15 [1970].

I foresee that the paragraph I am now writing will be misunderstood by some readers, but I do not intend their misunderstanding. I foresee that as a result of writing this paragraph, my pen will run out of ink sooner than if I did not write this paragraph, but I do not intend my pen's running out of ink. When I go to the dentist, I foresee that I shall suffer pain, but I do not intend the pain. I intend to keep my teeth in working order and I intend to have them repaired, but the pain contributes nothing to my objective or to the process of its realization. Pain is merely an unavoidable concomitant. True, I bring the pain upon myself by going to the dentist. But I "bring it upon" myself, I do not seek it or use it. A human being as a moral agent is not placed within a framework of already determinate situations, as a puppet is placed upon a stage created beforehand for it. The various environments in which we live are filled with facts somehow or other related to us and to our action, but our actual life-worlds are shaped by our interests and by the ways we select to satisfy our interests. Many effects of our behavior fall outside the scope of our intentions; some effects of our behavior have no significant reference to any human concern that we know of. Consequently, we certainly do not intend all the foreseen effects of our purposeful behavior.

# A2 Kant

Unless you introduce some innate good that all rational actors strive for, i.e. the basic goods, then all you’ve produced is an empty formalism. MacDonald:

James E. MacDonald, “Are Deontology and Teleology Mutually Exclusive?”, ***Journal of Business Ethics* 13: 615-623, 1994. RK**

Therefore, I am to do as I v^ould be done by: But how do I know how I would be done by? What sorts of harms ought I to protect myself against? I must first know how I should allow myself to be treated before I can know how^ I may allow myself to treat others. A missing identification of the true and comprehensive human good and the included basic goods of life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, religion and practical reasonableness, is needed to get started (Finnis, 1988).

# A2 Motivational Internalism

1. They have it backwards. Normative beliefs about how the world should be determine what desires we have. Brink[[1]](#footnote-1):

The Humean instrumentalist also believes that reason can only be the slave of the passions. But practical reason, we just said, can judge some commitments appropriate and others inappropriate. But then one would expect desire to be capable of responding to reason. **Judging a potential commitment appropriate tends to awaken desire, and** judging an existing commitment appropriate tends to sustain desire. By contrast, **judging a potential commitment inappropriate tends to produce aversion**, and judging an existing commitment inappropriate tends to weaken desire. These familiar observations are reinforced if we adopt a version of the sort of belief–desire psychology often associated with Humean moral psychology. On this view, as we have seen (§ 7 above), **intentional action is viewed as the product of representational states, such as belief, and pro-attitudes, such as desire, which display different directions of fit with the world**.On this sort of belief–desire psychology, **agents act in order to satisfy their desires based on their beliefs about the world**, in particular, their beliefs about the causal means to and necessary conditions of satisfying their desires. But, on this sort of psychology, we can also understand how **normative beliefs would** tend to **influence desire. For normative beliefs are beliefs about how the world should be**. But if **desires are precisely states that tend to make agents modify the world in accordance with their content,** then **we should expect normative beliefs normally to affect desires**.55 This is Green’s view (§§ 130–6). He accepts belief–desire psychology, because of their different directions of fit, and argues that for this reason desire can be responsive to ought judgments. This shows how one can accept the Humean dictum that action depends on desire without accepting the Humean dictum that reason can only be the slave of the passions.

So, since all justification has to end with the basic goods, the basic goods are what determine desire.

2. The basic goods transcend egoism because when we recognize something as a basic good, we must realize that they are not unique to us, and so respect the ends of others because they are similar to ours. The reason why we realize something is a basic good is not because it benefits us, but simply because it’s a self-evident reason for action that needs no further justification.

3. They are conflating two ways an actor can refuse to follow moral norms. Just because we are biased against acting morally is not a reason why we can’t. Frankfurt[[2]](#footnote-2):

**Being unable to bring oneself to perform an action is not the same as simply being overwhelmingly averse to performing it** . . . In addition, the aversion has his endorsement; and it constrains his conduct so effectively precisely because of this. **The person’s endorsement of his aversion is what distinguishes situations in which someone finds an action unthinkable from those in which an inability to act is due to addiction or to some other type of irresistible impulse**.

4. Motivational internalism rests on three conflations which are all false. Grisez:

Germain Grisez, [Former Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland], *The Way of the Lord Jesus* Vol. 1, RK

This view loses its plausibility when three confusions are removed. First, although it is true that one can avoid or assume some duties by choice, this does not mean one can avoid moral responsibility for wrongdoing merely by refusing to endorse the norm one is violating. For example, if one does not choose to marry, one has no duties to a spouse; but if one does marry, one cannot do away with such duties merely by not choosing to acknowledge them. 6. Second, arguments to support this view are often based on equivocations. For example, “decide” means both “judge” and “choose.” Judgments of conscience and choices can both be called “decisions,” but they are decisions in very different senses. One can decide that something is wrong (conscience) and decide to do it anyway (choice). When “decide” refers to judgment, it is a matter of detecting what is right or wrong; when it refers to choice, it is a matter of doing what is right or wrong. 7. Third, though moral norms are like laws in some ways, the two also differ. Moral norms can be true even if they are widely ignored. To be sure, one can render moral norms ineffective in one’s life by choosing to be immoral. Even so, they do not lack their proper force. A violated moral norm remains a moral truth and condemns as immoral the choice which violates it (see Rom 2.12; 3.9–20).

[Only if defending God]

Motivational internalism ignore the requirements of God. Grisez:

Germain Grisez, [Former Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland], *The Way of the Lord Jesus* Vol. 1, RK

But this view must be rejected. It makes the human person’s choice stand on its own without any ultimate measure, for it ignores the requirements which arise from the meanings and values God has embodied in creation, including human persons. Therefore, it allows grossly immoral ways of life equal moral status with the way of Jesus, and even makes it difficult to see how a clever person, careful about adopting moral norms, can go wrong. Some proponents of this view suggest that one can go wrong if one is inauthentic—inconsistent with one’s self-constituted standards. But they do not show why such inconsistency should be immoral, nor do they recognize the ease with which one can avoid inconsistency by being careful not to make decisions which truly tie one down.

# A2 Egoism

1. The basic goods transcend egoism because when we recognize something as a basic good, we must realize that they are not unique to us, and so respect the ends of others because they are similar to ours. The reason why we realize something is a basic good is not because it benefits us, but simply because it’s a self-evident reason for action that needs no further justification.
2. We have to act for the goods of others because we are all part of God’s goodness. Grisez:

Germain Grisez, [Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University], *The Way of the Lord Jesus,* vol. 1, Ch. 19: Fulfillment in Jesus and Human Fulfillment

In sum, the purpose of the whole of creation is divine goodness, considered insofar as it can be expressed in creation. Our fulfillment is to be like God, to manifest his goodness in our being and actions. We are called to live for God’s glory, not merely our own happiness. This is not because God is using us, but because our happiness is only part of that larger expression of God’s goodness which is the whole of creation. 6. Therefore, rather than being alternative purposes, God’s glory and human fulfillment are inseparably joined. Whatever takes away from human dignity takes away from God’s glory, because it takes away from the expression of his goodness (see *S.c.g.,* 3, 69).

# A2 Is/Ought Fallacy

1. The basic goods are not merely contingent human desires, they are intrinsic truths about human fulfillment, so they’re irreducibly normative. Grisez:

Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends”, American Journal of Jurisdiction vol. 32, 1987. RK

The most direct way to uncover the basic goods is by considering actions and asking, "Why are you doing that?" and "Why should we do that?" and so on. Persisting with such questions eventually un- covers a small number of basic purposes of diverse kinds. These purposes arouse interest because their intelligible aspects are instantiations of the diverse basic goods. The diversity of the basic goods is neither a mere contingent fact about human psychology nor an accident of history [section IV(B-C)]. Rather, being aspects of the fulfillment of persons, these goods correspond to the inherent complexities of human nature, as it is manifested both in individuals and in various forms of community. In other works we have provided somewhat different lists of the most general categories of basic goods. But the following seven categories now seem to us adequate.

1. They don’t understand the framework. Grisez 1 proves that when we act deliberately, we are pursuing one or more of the basic goods. Grisez 2 proves that in order to be moral, we must be rational, which means having a will towards all the basic goods, since we recognize them all as reasons for action. That is where I generate an “ought” from an “is”.

# A2 Non-cognitivism

Moral disagreement doesn’t mean there are no moral truths. Grisez:

Germain Grisez, [Former Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland], *The Way of the Lord Jesus* Vol. 1, RK

Difficulties in settling moral disputes bring out the special character of moral principles, which are neither matters of fact nor logical requirements. But these difficulties do not show that there are no moral truths. Agreement is sometimes reached in moral disputes. People admit that their previous judgments were in error and correct them. Such admissions would make no sense if conscience were nothing more than superego. It is also worth noticing that agreement is not always easily come by in fields other than morality. Psychologists, economists, and physicists also have their seemingly unresolvable differences, but no one concludes from this that there are no truths of psychology, economics, and physics.

# A2 Euthyphro/God is Arbitrary

Since God is kind and loving, he creates the true requirements for our fulfillment without choosing arbitrarily. Grisez:

Germain Grisez, [Former Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland], *The Way of the Lord Jesus* Vol. 1, RK

Still, this view must also be rejected. It is inconsistent with the truth of faith that God directs all things wisely and lovingly, not arbitrarily and despotically. The normative force of his commands cannot follow from the mere fact that he commands, any more than from the fact that we choose (see Dt 4.5–8). God’s will ought of course to be followed, but faith provides a cogent reason for doing so: that he is leading and guiding us toward our true good (see Ps 23).[14](http://www.twotlj.org/G-1-4-D.html" \l "Note14" \o "jump to note) 4. God’s will is not some sort of irrational force. By choice, he freely creates and redeems all things according to a wise plan. His wisdom settles what is good and bad for us and all creatures. By wisdom God makes us what we are and thus determines the true requirements for our fulfillment (see Gn 1.26–30; 2.18–24; Wis 7.21–8.1; DS 3002–3/1783–84; see S.t., 1–2, q. 71, a. 2, ad 4; q. 91, a. 2; q. 93, aa. 1–2; q. 100, a. 8). He does not make things right and wrong by an additional, arbitrary choice. 5. In short, moral norms are truths about how to act in ways that are humanly good (seeS.t., 1–2, q. 99, a. 1; S.c.g., 3, 122). It is not the case that any judgment of conscience could as well be reversed if God chose to reverse it. Human nature being what it is, it simply cannot be humanly fulfilling to act contrary to a correct judgment of conscience; and since God is wise and loving, he could not direct us to act against our own well-being (see S.t., 1–2, q. 100, a. 8;S.c.g., 3, 129).

1. David Brink, [Professor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego], “The Significance of Desire”, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 3, edited by* RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU, Oxford University Press, 2008. RK [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Frankfurt, Harry. (1971). “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” *The Journal of*

   *Philosophy* 68. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988a: 11-25. RK [↑](#footnote-ref-2)